Possible Futures: Afghanistan

Joe Waters looks into the political climate, as well as potential forces for change, in Afghanistan – a country which has been in a state of tumultuous conflict for most of the last three decades. As large parts of the nation again find themselves under Taliban rule and the U.S. begin their departure, the power vacuum created is one that could be filled in any number of ways: a depressing number of which involve bloodshed. Will the country become a proxy for geopolitical conflict? Will it descend into factional chaos? Or will the Taliban bring an uneasy peace?

By July 15th of this year, there will only be 8,600 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and, if all goes to plan then, by the end of 2021, there will be none. It is fair to say that success of America’s forays into the region is moot. However, many from both sides of the U.S. political spectrum currently support ending “the forever war.” The question now is less to do with what has been achieved and more with simply getting out quickly. The sense that leaving a nation to fend for itself is preferable to any kind of intervention might have more ground if it were not for the other large nations attempting to advance their own interests in Afghanistan. In 2018, the Washington Post reported that “Russian officials believed the [Taliban] no longer posed a threat to Russian interests […and] like Russia, opposed a long-term U.S. military presence and hoped to extinguish the Islamic State.” Hence, Russia has made attempts to enter into a relationship with the Taliban, to leverage power in the region to their advantage. Similarly, Afghanistan is in the sights of China, who wish to incorporate it into their “Belt and Road Initiative,” in order to increase their dominance in international trade.

But what of America’s supposed aims in the region? The democracy they laid the foundations for is floundering. Only one million, out of the nine million eligible to vote (in a country of nearly 40 million) turned up to the polling booth at the last election. Many believe the low voter turnout is due to disillusionment with the corruption of successive governments. A 2012 UNODC report found that over 40% of adult Afghans were potentially involved in the payment of bribes. Many hoped that this would change after President Hamid Karzai left office, but a 2015 poll found that only 27.5.% were satisfied with current president Ashraf Ghani’s leadership. Public opinion was not bolstered by the 2019 allegations of government posts being granted in exchange for sexual favours. All in all, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the current government. To many, they seem both ideologically uninspiring and weak. With more dying in terrorist attacks than of Covid-19 (even as Kabul’s lack of medical provision does lead to terrible loss of life), the current vision of stability and the rule of law is flimsy at best.

Meanwhile, some (depending on who you ask, up to 95% of the population) are coming around to the idea that Taliban rule might actually be more conducive to peace than the current system. Depressingly, this could be true even if just because attacks by the Taliban might stop (“might” rather than “will” because there is more than one faction of Taliban). However, those looking for a resolution push the view that the militants have become easier to deal with in recent years. It has even been claimed, by some close to the former royal family, that they are becoming more liberal with regard to women’s rights and would not prevent women’s education even if they barred women from holding the highest-ranking positions (those Taliban present in the Doha talks draw the line at allowing women to be judges or take the presidency). All of these claims are debatable but it’s still true to say that peace under the Taliban could prove preferable to the alternative. The peoples and factions of Afghanistan are not exactly united. The Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and other minorities all have their own conflicting interests. A prevailing view is that, in the absence of a U.S. presence, civil war will break out much like in the early 90s. It is hard not to see the truth in this prediction.

What, then, is the way out for Afghanistan? Is returning to Taliban rule really the only way? It has been argued that perhaps civil war is not quite inevitable. There is one thing that could prevent it: desire for an end to conflict. While the many disparate peoples of Afghanistan may not identify with each other or their government, what they do identify with is a desire for peace. The tumultuous years of fighting that this nation has lived through would make anyone sane cry “enough!” The mood in discussions of the country’s fate is one of weariness and depression. Many of the parties involved feel crushed by the constant barrage of death and failure their nation has been presented with. Maybe, just maybe, these negative sentiments can be harnessed and used as fuel to take the most radical step possible in the next age of Afghanistan: to do nothing. No more militant, ideological deaths. A collective standing still, a lack of encroachment could just about inaugurate the first step to some kind of valuable peace process. It’s a long shot but it is at least envisionable. And envisioning is the first step in achieving any kind of reality.

Image – U.S. Department of State: “Secretary Pompeo Participates in a Signing Ceremony in Doha”

Iran has ties with Al Qa’eda says Trump – since when?

This comes in from Stafford Clarry, senior member of the Next Century Foundation in Iraq:

Here it comes.  The Trump administration is stressing a link between Iran and Al-Qaeda as a justification to invoke the 2001 AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force) as authorization to conduct armed conflict against Iran.
Indications are the link between Iran and Al-Qaeda is tenuous (weak).
“Lawmakers are wary of officials using links between Iran and Al Qaeda as a pretext for war because the administration of President George W. Bush talked of a relationship between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda in 2002 to build a case for the invasion of Iraq. There were never close ties between the two.”

The New York Times 19 June 2019
Iran Has Ties to Al Qaeda, Trump Officials Tell Skeptical Congress
WASHINGTON — Administration officials are briefing Congress on what they say are ties between Iran and Al Qaeda, prompting skeptical reactions and concern on Capitol Hill that the White House could invoke the war authorization passed in 2001 as legal cover for military action against Tehran.
As tensions between the United States and Iran have surged, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Pentagon officials have told members of Congress and aides in recent weeks about what they say is a pattern of ties between Iran and the terrorist group going back to after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, officials said.
They have stopped short of telling lawmakers or aides in large group settings that the 2001 authorization for the use of military force from Congress, which permits the United States to wage war on Al Qaeda and its allies or offshoots, would allow the Trump administration to go to war with Iran. President Trump has said he does not want a war, but he ordered 2,500 additional troops to the region in the last month in response to what American officials said was a heightened threat.
Statements tying Iran and Al Qaeda by Mr. Pompeo and other officials point to the potential for the administration to justify invoking the 2001 authorization, some lawmakers say. And when asked in recent weeks by lawmakers and journalists whether the administration would use the 2001 authorization, Mr. Pompeo has deflected the questions.
“They are looking to bootstrap an argument to allow the president to do what he likes without coming to Congress, and they feel the 2001 authorization will allow them to go to war with Iran,” said Senator Tim Kaine, Democrat of Virginia.
Mr. Kaine, a member of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, declined to discuss details of classified briefings, but said senior administration officials had “talked about Iran providing safe haven to Al Qaeda.”
Mr. Pompeo, a West Point graduate and former C.I.A. director, visited United States Central Command in Florida on Tuesday to talk about Iran with military commanders as acting Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan announced his resignation.
In a classified briefing that Mr. Pompeo gave on May 21 with Pentagon officials to the full House, “he discussed the relationship between Iran and Al Qaeda,” said Representative Elissa Slotkin, Democrat of Michigan.
She said Mr. Pompeo’s talk of that relationship in both public and private settings and his refusal to answer questions on a potential use of the 2001 authorization “raises the specter that to him, the relationship between Iran and Al Qaeda gives the administration that authority.”
Ms. Slotkin, a former C.I.A. analyst and Pentagon official who has worked in Iraq, added, “Any of us working on national security should be looking at any talk of ties between senior Iranian leaders and Al Qaeda with a real skeptical eye.”
On Monday, two Pentagon officials gave a classified briefing on Iran to legislative aides in which they mentioned Al Qaeda ties, according to a person with direct knowledge of the session.
That surprised the aides, who then pressed the officials — Michael P. Mulroy, the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary for the Middle East, and a Defense Intelligence Agency representative — on their assertions.
The topic was addressed directly at a House hearing on Wednesday by Representative Ted Deutch, Democrat of Florida. Mr. Deutch pointedly asked Brian Hook, the State Department’s special representative on Iran, whether the administration was preparing to tell Congress it had approval to go to war with Iran under the 2001 authorization because of ties between Tehran and Al Qaeda.
Mr. Hook responded that Congress should ask the department’s legal adviser for an opinion.
“We will do everything that we are required to do with respect to congressional war powers, and we will comply with the law,” he said.
Iran is a majority Shiite Muslim nation while Al Qaeda is a hard-line Sunni group whose members generally consider Shiites to be apostates. The two have often fought on opposing sides of regional conflicts, including the Syrian war.
Any relationship between Iran and Al Qaeda is one of convenience and not a real alliance, said current and former American officials, and there is no public evidence that Tehran has allowed Al Qaeda operatives to plot attacks on the United States from Iran or offered a haven for large numbers of fighters.
Lawmakers are wary of officials using links between Iran and Al Qaeda as a pretext for war because the administration of President George W. Bush talked of a relationship between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda in 2002 to build a case for the invasion of Iraq. There were never close ties between the two.
The question of whether Mr. Trump might strike Iran has intensified since early May, when the White House announced military movements because of what American officials said was new intelligence showing a heightened threat against American interests from Iran or allied militias.
Mr. Trump then announced a deployment of 1,500 more troops to the Middle East, and on Monday he said he was sending 1,000 more. The administration has blamed Iran for two sets of oil tanker attacks. Iranian officials said Monday that their country would soon breach limits on uranium enrichment set by a 2015 nuclear deal from which Mr. Trump withdrew more than a year ago.
The possibility of war against Iran has invigorated efforts by Democratic and some Republican lawmakers to limit the president’s war powers. On Tuesday, two Republican senators, Rand Paul of Kentucky and Mike Lee of Utah, joined with Mr. Kaine and three other senators to send a letter to Mr. Trump saying “Congress has not authorized war with Iran and no current statutory authority allows the U.S. to conduct hostilities against the government of Iran.”
Mr. Paul pressed Mr. Pompeo in a Senate committee hearing in April to declare that the administration would not use the 2001 authorization to go to war with Iran. Mr. Pompeo said he preferred to “just leave that to lawyers,” then stressed ties between Al Qaeda and Iran: “There is no doubt there is a connection. Period. Full stop.”
On Sunday, Mr. Pompeo refused to answer when he was asked three times on CBS News’ “Face the Nation” whether the administration had the legal authority to attack Iran.
In his May 21 classified presentation to the House, Mr. Pompeo went into more detail on the Al Qaeda ties, said Ms. Slotkin and other lawmakers. Representative Matt Gaetz, a Florida Republican who is an ally of Mr. Trump, said in a committee hearing last week that administration officials made remarks in the classified May briefing that pointed to the idea that the 2001 authorization permitted “hostilities toward Iran.”
In a June 13 news conference in which he listed recent attacks “instigated” by Iran, Mr. Pompeo mentioned a suicide car bombing in Kabul that killed four civilians and injured four American service members and a number of bystanders. It was the first time an American official had said Iran was behind the attack, which was aimed at an American convoy, even though the Taliban had claimed responsibility. Iran has generally not commanded attacks against Americans in Afghanistan, unlike in the Iraq War, and analysts and lawmakers — including Mr. Deutch on Wednesday — questioned why Mr. Pompeo is trying to make the link now.
After the Sept. 11 attacks and before American forces bombed Afghanistan, more than a dozen senior Al Qaeda members fled to Iran. The circumstances under which they lived there were murky, but some senior officials, including Saif al-Adel, were apparently detained by Iran and later traded in a supposed prisoner swap with a Qaeda branch in Yemen.
Terrorism analysts say Hamza bin Laden, a son of Osama bin Laden, was in Iran at the time. He is now believed to be in Pakistan or Afghanistan and is considered a rising Qaeda leader. He dislikes Iran because he and his mother were imprisoned for years there, said Ali Soufan, a former F.B.I. terrorism investigator.
Mr. Al-Adel and other Qaeda officials have had freedom of movement in Iran at times, said Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations.
The Trump administration might argue that some military strikes against Iran do not require congressional permission. One potential such action would be a bombing of the Natanz nuclear facility, an option debated over the years by American and Israeli military officials.
Attorney General William P. Barr also has unusually broad views of a president’s power to unilaterally start even a major war.
The long-simmering discussion of presidential war powers in Congress has come to a boil in recent months, with bipartisan groups of lawmakers in both chambers introducing legislation that would place limits on the president.
The measures have found some support among moderate Republicans and constitutional conservatives who think the president’s ability to wage war should be limited.
At a hearing last week, Representative Mac Thornberry of Texas, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, said, “I do not believe, for what it’s worth, the 2001 A.U.M.F. authorizes force against the state of Iran.”

The Blade, the Bullet and the Bomb

The blade the bullet and the bomb know no morality, they have one purpose only, to kill and injure. Those who wield these weapons of destruction have choices; they are moral beings who have chosen the way of violence. This choice is informed by their beliefs and their beliefs informed by their chosen cause or ideology; or both.

If choosing the way of violence is based upon an extreme ideology then they have adopted an uncompromising  view of the world and how it should be ordered which requires them, and their co-believers, to spare nothing or no one in pursuit of their ultimate aims; barbarity is unleashed, violence spirals and any semblance of humanity abandoned; they appropriate for themselves the appearance of an irresistible force. However, as in the paradoxical proposition “What will happen if an irresistible force meets and immovable object?” nothing in nature is absolutely irresistible and nothing is absolutely immovable. In the gritty realities of power struggles action and reaction happen by degrees and each mirrors the worst aspects of the other and thus violence breeds violence “Those who live by the sword, die by the sword.” (From the Christian Gospel)

Am I describing Daesh? I could also be describing Cromwell’s Model Army in the England of 1640s or Fascist regimes in Europe in the 1930s and 40s. All believed themselves invincible all were ultimately vanquished. Their legacy was and is more violence. Violence breeds violence.

(Quote)”The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy, instead of diminishing evil, it multiplies it. Through violence you may murder the liar, but you cannot murder the lie, nor establish the truth. Through violence you may murder the hater, but you do not murder hate. In fact, violence merely increases hate. Returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that”. Martin Luther King Junior

Plato said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”

Violence breeds violence and its siblings are: vengeance, reprisal and retaliation. Governments, as well as individuals, adopt these siblings and unleash them at will.  To break the spiral of violence we must contend with these forces of vengeance and violence at their root cause.

All wars end. Either through attrition, intervention, diplomacy or capitulation conflicts cease. But the end of conflict is rarely the beginning of a sustainable peace; too often the end of fighting is merely the impression of peace when in reality it is an armed truce vacillating between possible futures.

For years, America the UK and their allies have appropriated to themselves the mantle of a global, interventionist morality. This policy has been seen by many as either little too late or at worst disastrous for all concerned. For the first time in modern history the consequence of this deeply flawed morality has brought the victims of intervention, in seemingly overwhelming numbers, onto their shores and into their streets. Traumatised, at times half dead, physically and psychologically scarred, starving and despairing they are as much the West’s casualties as any of our armed forces killed or injured in recent wars. Violence breeds violence.

From the violence suffered by traumatised refugees coming to our shores, a new violent reaction is being embodied in the resurgence of reactionary, populist political forces in America, Europe and elsewhere. The populist slogans they scream and chant are a repudiation of the so called liberal, democratic values which have dominated international discourse since 1989. These new forces are indifferent or opposed to any assertion of international morality. They will use violence (rhetorically and actual) to secure their nation’s borders, engender a patriotic siege mentality and practice isolationism from global intervention; rather than try and do intervention better they prefer not to do it at all.

In the Levant, Western influence has waned and is seen as fatally flawed, other regional powers have filled the vacuum but they have historical and ideological agendas which are inimical to the West.

The West, meanwhile, is verging on economic bankruptcy; the UN is also deprived of funds and in thrall to the Security Council, the new American regime is inexperienced and lacks credibility and Europe is fragmenting as a political project. Western intervention seems to be reduced to targeted military strikes in the Levant and anxiety about trade deals elsewhere. The West seems gripped by a moral inertia. So from where will arise new energy for global conciliation and rapprochement come? Russia, China, Turkey, India? Are we in a diplomatic winter?

(Quote from Quran)  “There is no good in most of their secret talks save (except) (in) him who orders Sadaqah (charity in Allah’s Cause), or Maa‘roof (Islamic Monotheism and all the good and righteous deeds which Allah has ordained), or conciliation between mankind; and he who does this, seeking the good Pleasure of Allah, We shall give him a great reward” (Quran, Surah An-Nisaa, 114)

If the Great Reward goes to the conciliators of this world (“Blessed are the Peace makers” Quote from Christian scriptures) then we need an uprising of peacemakers and an army of reconcilers. (The Aramea Foundation, NCF, IoC?). We need a coalition of the willing who will work tirelessly and sacrificially for Peace; demanding a renewal of ethically based foreign policies, a renewal of internationalism, reaching out to enemies and bringing light to the darkest places.

As a person of faith I know faith’s shortcomings but I also know its power to inspire and transform lives and situations and to give vision and hope to humanity in its days of darkness:  “To turn spears into pruning hooks and where people will study war no more” (Quote from Jewish Scriptures).

Faith must play a significant role in post conflict Syria and Iraq, Syria and Iraq will also need all the goodwill that can be mustered and a Marshall type plan of economic and civic reconstruction unprecedented in modern times. This is the cost of the West’s repentance and the East’s intransigence and the Middle East’s incoherence.

Within any plans for the possible futures in the war torn areas of the Levant, their  must be a plan for  the future of Jerusalem, that city set on a hill which is the rallying point for so much human longing for God.

May we find new hope, new vision and new determination to shape a future where it is not the dead who see an end to war, but the living.

Fr Larry Wright

Poetry in the Arab world and its use by Jihadist groups

Elsabeth Kendall speaks about Jihadist Poetry on ANN TV

Poetry, is a deep-rooted element of the life of the Arabs, right back from the pre-Islamic age to nowadays. However Classical poetry has become a secret weapon, and Jihadist groups, such as ISIS or Al Qaida, are using it to spread their ideologies.

Poetry in the pre-Islamic time

The use of Arabic poetry by today’s jihadists comes at the end of a long tradition of poetry employed as a cultural tool to win social and political capital, dating right back to pre-Islamic times. Poetry has always been at the heart of Arab world, and at that time poetry was the equivalent of our social media today. Through poetry, the Arabs expressed their feelings, love, sorrow, they praised or mocked people with poetry.

In fact, one verse of poetry could raise the status of a whole tribe or, by contrast, humiliate it. By way of example, there was a tribe call Banu Anf al Naqa (which literally translates as the sons of the Camel’s nose). A group of Brothers shared a camel, they all took a part of it, and left the nose to the last one. The one who took the nose became known as the Camel’s nose. Later he would have his own tribe and they became known as the Banu Anf al Naqa. If you asked one of them, which tribe are came from? they were reluctant to say Banu Anf al Naqa. Until a poet said:

 ومن يسوي بأنف الناقة الذنبا  قوم هم الأنف والأذناب غيرهم

Literally, this means: They are the nose, and the tails are the others, and could the tail equal the nose? The poet wanted to say that all parts of a body are behind the nose, a metaphor to say that this tribe, Banu Anf al Naqa are the first, up in front. This verse spread through all the Arabic lands, and Banu Anf al Naqa started to take pride in of their tribe, and this just because of a couple of words.

Arabs even used to have a souk dedicated to poetry, where poets came to “broadcast their new lyrics”. The most talented would get a purse, and would see his poem spreading out in all the Arabic lands.

Another example which illustrates the centrality of poetry in pre-Islamic times is the seven mou’alaqat (المعلقات السبع which literally means something that is hung). This is one of the most famous Arabic collections of poetry. It consists of seven poems, written by the seven most famous poets at that time. It is said that we call them mou’alaqat because they were written in gold and hung on the Kaaba itself. Another version said that when you hear it, it will be hung on your heart.

The Age of Islam

During the age of Islam poetry keeps its essential place, probably moreso than before. The prophet Mohamed (peace be upon him), himself used poetry. Even though he did not write poetry, he had his own poets. He knew how poetry could be used as a strategic weapon. A Hadith clearly states that the prophet (peace be upon him) said: “poetry is more effective on the Quraish than showering arrows on them.”

To discredit his message, Mohamed (peace be upon him) was accused of being a poet several times in the Quran. Nonetheless, he never wrote poetry as we said, for the simple reason, that he feared that people could confuse his message, revealed by God, with his poetry.

Indeed, as in poetry, we find in Quran rhythm, rhymes, alliterations, and so on, which is appreciated by Arabic literature. However, a verse in Quran, cut all ambiguities and says: And We have not taught him poetry, nor is it meet for him ; it is nothing but a reminder and plain Quran (chapter 36, verse 69)

In addition to its political functions, poetry was used in many ways. Firstly, it spread the new message of Islam. Secondly by using poetry, Muslim scholars were able to explain the Quran and hadiths, the two sources of Islam, especially to prove the meaning of some words. Then, poetry has been instrumental in the development of the Arabic language, with its formal grammar.

We also record Islamic sciences, such as jurisprudence, hadith, grammar and history, in poetry, to memorize it. Obviously, with its prose, rhythm and rhyme it is more easy to memorize than a simple text.

Today, classical poetry is still relevant in the Arab world and we can see it in everyday life. When you go to the mosque the imams often use poetry to convey their messages, on the TV (we have a TV show, the equivalent of the Britain’s got talent, where the audience votes for the best poet), or in political debates.

Poetry is not merely a hobby for rich, well educated people; in Arab culture poetry is accessible to all, everyone knows poetry in Arab society.

What is classical Arabic poetry?

In the 7th century a man called, al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī, would completely change the Arabic literacy. It is said that when he performed the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, he prayed God to give him a knowledge no one else has had before him. He studied all the pre-Islamic poetry, and codified what we called ʻarud (العروض. What we can translate by meter), an established pattern for a verse. Al-Khalīl discovered 15 metres of Arab poetry.

One of them called al rajz, is quite easy, presented under this shape (each verse is made up of units of two lines printed side by side with a space between them as we can see below):

مستفعلن مستفعلن مستفعلن مستفعلن مستفعلن مستفعلن

This is the easiest way to write a poem, we call it the donkey of poets (حمار الشعراء, because for an Arabian it is as easy to write a poem with this bahr as riding a donkey).

Jihadist Poetry

ISIS, and Al Qaida before, seems to take advantages of this tool. The question is why did they use poetry, and how?

By its unique style, poetry has the ability to stay in the collective memories, it does not need computers, or mobile phones. Poetry provides the means to get an easy, inexpensive and powerful propagation of ideas through oral transmission.

Besides this practical function, Jihadist poetry “plays a major role in helping to produce a jihadist identity” says Dr. Elizabeth Kendall Senior Research Fellow in Arabic and Islamic Studies, who works on the connections between militant jihadist/political movements and cultural production in Arabic. Poetry helps to create this identity, for example, by referencing heroic figures from Islamic history, employing well-known tropes (such as referring to jihadists as lions and warriors).

Poetry allows some to legitimise acts of terror and strengthens the jihadist identity by constructing a coherent ‘enemy’. Poetry helps you to know who you are fighting, and simplifies a complex political landscape in something easy to understand for a child. America did this too, when George Bush talked about a “War on Terror”.

Poetry can also present an alternative reality. Poetry has this amazing power to paint for you something that we cannot put in a video, employing hyperbole when mentioning contemporary jihadist acts, eulogizing martyrs or mythologizing their virtues.

This provides a powerful emotional means of reassuring current and future recruits by confirming the worth of recent martyrs, praising their virile qualities and celebrating their achievements at the same time as mourning their loss.

The kind of poetry used

Sada el malahim (صدى الملاحم), a Jihadist journals, that we can find online, contain an excessive amount of poetry. Dr Kendall, said that when it comes to Jihadist propoganda “on average one page in five contains poetry”. However, poetry is missed out by Western authorities went it comes to examining translated texts from those journals, whereas it is in poetry, as we saw above, that a lot of messages are being conveyed.

A good part of it comes from the pre-Islamic time, so called el Jahilya, the Age of Ignorance, which is quite surprising. How can an extremist jihadist group use poetry from Arabian polytheist poets? Dr Kendall has two interpretations: either they do not know their poetry well, or it does not matter for them.

I would say that at that time almost all of the poetry was about tribal war, bravery, courage and heroism in battle. The Jihadists are using this part of the pre-Islamic age, and they re-set it in a modern context to justify and beautify their actions.  However, besides its narrations of grand battles, pre-Islamic poetry is well known for its amorous encounters.

The best example is ‘Antarah Ibn Shaddad al-‘Absi, he was a pre-Islamic Arabian hero and poet (525-608) famous both for his adventurous life and his romance with Abla, Antara’ a cousin with whom he fell in love, and sought to marry. Antara’ poetry gathers together the two strands, adventure and love. One example which illustrates that, is a verse of a poetry when he said that when he is fighting in a battle and he sees the blood spurting into the air, and that reminds him ‘Abla’s lips. ISIS would probably pass this part.

Jihadist write as well their own poetry, which is as we said above not too difficult for a good Arabic speaker. Oussama Ben Laden, or Ayman al-zawahiri for example wrote their own poetry.

Who is targeted?

This kind of poetry targets local communities in the Middle East, because poetry belongs to their culture, and they might be more easily manipulated than an occidental audience.

Poetry attracts local intention, because it sticks to tradition, and probably, because it is less boring than long ideological treatises that tell of plans and aims, treatises that the authorities are often more focused on.

Through poetry you can go back to traditional values. Especially in the desert, where there is no internet, or smart phones, you can spread your ideology by the word of mouth and poetry is an excellent way to do it.

Poetry is more important for people living in the desert. According to a survey made by Dr Kendall in eastern Yemen, ’74% of the respondent said that poetry is either important or very important in their daily life’.  And this is not new, in fact traditional poetry had emerged from Bedouin life. People living in deserts, (we called them a’rab in arabic اعراب) have always been the most interested in poetry. In parallel, it is in deserts where Al Qaida has a strong hold, as in Yemen. And the desert is not unique to Yemen, we have desert in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Sinai, all places where either ISIS or Al Qaida are present.

Through a blend of techniques: powerful images, historical allusions, linguistic beauty, rhyme or rhythm, classical poetry has the ability to move Arab listeners and readers emotionally. Poetry creates an aura of tradition, authenticity and legitimacy. This ability appears as a perfect weapon for militant jihadist causes.

Therefore, it seems surprising that counter-terrorism efforts have not yet made full use of poetry as a vehicle for counter-propaganda.

I will finish by these few verses, written by myself:

بل  أرواحا  يقاتل جهلا يحسب  أنّه  يحسن  صنعا
فلا حمز بلغت ولا بلالا فما أنت وهؤلاء الفضلاء
فالدين  سلام  لا  قتالا فما  كَلامك   إلّا   كِلام


He thinks that he is accomplishing good deeds, but he is just killing blindly.

Who are you compared to the virtuous, you will never reach Hamza or Bilal.

Your speech is nothing else but wounds, whereas religion is peace, not murder.

Islamic State Infiltrates Somalia

AMISOM Forces Re-enter Kismayo

Somalia has re-entered the international spotlight in recent weeks amidst growing alarm over a new, active Islamic State (IS) presence in East Africa. In an official statement circulated on social media, the group claimed responsibility for the detonation of a bomb (an IED) in the outskirts of Mogadishu, allegedly marking its first Somali-based attack. While independent verification is ongoing, some claim that this may mark a significant juncture for regional stability. Commentators have not only alluded to a growth in local IS sympathies but have raised concerns over the prospect of rifts within local Jihadism that could precipitate a new wave of violence.

Historically, IS has struggled to find traction in Somalia, in contrast to its progress elsewhere on the continent. Having integrated a broad constellation of African franchises, ranging from the Nigerian based Boko Haram to Ansar Beit al Maqdis in the Sinai, and establishing a series of enclaves along the Libyan coast, the group has efficiently co-opted local insurgencies and expanded its global footprint. However, this momentum seems to have stalled with al-Shabaab. Despite courting Sheikh Abu Ubaidah, IS has been consistently repudiated by Shabaab’s media branch, al Kataib, which continues to question the Caliphate’s legitimacy and long term viability. Instead the group moved aggressively to monopolise Jihadism in East Africa, reaffirming its affiliation with al-Qaeda and preemptively suppressing any dissent through a series of internal purges. Indeed, after launching a relatively successful resurgence throughout the Somali hinterland over the course of 2015,  Shabaab seemed to have re-consolidated its domestic position.

However, the Mogadishu bomb attack claimed by IS has somewhat challenged these assumptions, indicating a new geo-strategic reality beyond the Shabaab-centric orthodoxy where new actors are becoming increasingly active. This has been compounded by a number of splinter groups recently seceding from, and now competing against, the parent insurgency. Contingents led by British-Somali Abdul Nadir Mumin, now operating in Galdung, and a new transnational amalgam calling itself Jahba East Africa, have started siphoning local support from Shabaab denouncing it as a “psychological and physical prison”.

Reports have also surfaced describing possible linkages between IS and planned biological attacks in Kenya, suggesting the group may be experiencing a local resurgence. IS seems to appeal to disenchanted militias from Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and these new affiliates are not only cultivating a broader IS constituency across East Africa but re-conceptualising regional Jihad as a multipolar struggle. This therefore raises important questions as to how an increasingly diverse insurgency will impact AMISOM (the African Union Mission in Somalia) and international development efforts, as well as the degree to which al Shabaab may become embroiled in internecine conflict and the implications such a confrontation may have for the broader competition between IS and al Qaeda.

Nevertheless, while there are concerns that need to be addressed, it can also be argued these are relatively superficial issues with a tendency to detract from the key challenges now facing Somalia and East Africa. Aside from the fact that the rumours of a possible biological attack in Kenya remain unverified, and AMISOM  has dismissed any IS involvement in the Mogadishu bombing, the broader effort to map shifting allegiances between various militants has limited utility. As Bronwyn Bruton, the deputy director of the African Center at the Atlantic Council aptly suggests the “relationships (between Jihadist groups) are fluid and not all that meaningful from an operational standpoint”. While the top leadership may be ideologically invested in particular factions, the affiliation of individual fighters is largely determined by “who (is) paying them that day”.

This may seem like a sweeping generalisation, but these are transient dynamics that are largely defined by small differences in politics, personality and economic opportunity. In reality the threat of IS and al Shabaab originate from the same drivers. The international community should therefore focus on delivering comprehensive solutions to address the underlying causes of radicalisation, rather than analysing nominal differences between the radical actors themselves.